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Introductory Comments 
 
There is little doubt that over the 15 years or so that I have been a private sector economist, 
the subject of house prices (and, in particular, their future direction) has always attracted a 
great deal of attention from audiences that I have addressed.  If I can start by way of an 
understatement, nothing much has changed in the past few years.  Indeed, the public debate 
that has raged about the ramifications of higher house prices in Australia – and indeed the 
Anglo Saxon world more generally – has produced some very colourful descriptions of 
“bubbles” and debate about whether or not “it will all end in tears”. 
 
At one end of the spectrum is the “Economist” magazine which has consistently and 
colourfully argued, amongst other things that: 
 
-  “Australia’s housing market could be as much a victim of irrational exuberance as 
America’s stock-market has been” (March 2003); 
 
-  “inflated house prices pose an even bigger risk to the world economy than oil” (June 
2004); and, most recently 
 
-  “the world rise in house prices is the biggest bubble in history.  Prepare for the economic 
pain when it pops” (June 2005)
1 
 
While no-where near as sensationalist, concerns have also from time to time been expressed 
by members of the Australian official family.  Thus the Secretary of Treasury Ken Henry in 
2003 (“off the record”) talked about the Australian property market as a “bubble”, while the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank, Ian Macfarlane, has in numerous public offerings expressed 
his concern about the sustainability of the housing market – especially, in the period 2003-
2004. 
 
Not surprisingly, such talk has had significant impacts on public perceptions.  Thus, for 
example, since late 2003 we at the National Australia Bank Ltd (NAB) have asked a question 
in our Quarterly Business Survey about whether or not “a residential property price bubble 
exists in Australia”.  As shown below, in late 2003, 76 percent of respondents answered yes.  
Also, interestingly, that dire expectation has progressively eroded – and today more 
respondents answer “no” than “yes”. 
 
Does a Residential Property Price Bubble
 Exist in Australia?
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By engineering significant changes in public perceptions policy makers can, in certain 
circumstances, set in place powerful expectational effects.  I, for one, would argue that the 
Reserve Bank of Australia has been quite successful in talking up the risks of both the 
potential for house price falls and interest rate increases.  That has, in effect, by changing 
public perceptions been used as an alternative for actually tightening policy significantly (and - 3 - 
hence risking a potentially much rockier outcome).  To some extent the approach could be 
summarised as “watch my words not my actions” - or in the recent UK parlance, the 
“Maradona” approach to monetary policy.
2 
 
As an economist working for an institution in which around half its balance sheet is directly 
exposed to housing you might not be surprised to learn that we, at the National, have spent a 
good deal of time trying to better understand the linkages between house prices, the 
robustness of households balance sheets, consumer demand for credit and actual consumer 
spending - a topic which the Reserve Bank is also maintaining a close interest.
3 
 
In the following I will attempt to:  
 
-  draw out some of the dangers of simplistic analysis of household balance sheets – 
especially those using debt to income ratios; 
-  explore what the data is really telling us re household balance sheets – including an 
alternative approach to the linkages between house prices and housing finance 
availability; 
-  present some empirical results on: 
- the drivers of Australian house prices, and 
- the linkages from house prices (and other variables) to consumer spending. 
 
-  and finally, I will attempt to draw all of the above together in a few conclusions about the 
operation of the economy and potential risks/challenges ahead. 
 
  
Be Careful in Interpreting Some Measures of Household Indebtedness/Gearing 
 
There is no doubt that increased gearing and significantly faster growth in Australian house 
prices relative to both broader measures of wage and price inflation, has seen fairly startling 
changes in some measures relating household debt to house prices and incomes.  Two such 
commonly cited ratios are debt to income and house prices to income. 
 
Housing Debt to AWE
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The above charts are clearly startling!  Too often however analysts are inclined to say given 
these trends we have a “bubble” and it is, QED, only a matter of time before a large 
“correction” (read crunch) must follow. 
 
Debt to income ratios, in particular, are misleading as the implicit assumption seems to be 
that, at current ratios, the whole process is unsustainable.  My strong view is that all such 
ratios tell us is that there has been a fundamental change in the gearing ratios of households 
– but what ratio is unsustainable is uncertain.  To put this in perspective, if ratios around 160 
percent are unsustainable, how have countries like the Netherlands survived at ratios - 4 - 
approaching 300 percent.  Further it should be noted that as only around one third of 
households have a mortgage the average debt to income ratio of those actually with a 
mortgage is also around 300 per cent.  Even more important, as an economist, I have some 
difficulty in interpreting ratios comparing stocks of debt with income flows.  House prices to 
income ratios clearly have implications for affordability (especially those new to the market) 
but do not necessarily give much useful knowledge about the sustainability of current ratios – 
provided the household has an on-going income flow.  I intend to come back to this issue – 
which is critical – later in this paper. 
 
Rather than comparing stocks to flows, let us now look at stock to stock and flow to flow 
comparisons of movements in Australian household assets, debts and income levels. 
 
While again it is difficult to know what is a sustainable level, the following chart  shows 
Australian households’ total housing debt to the value of the housing stock is much less 
alarmist.  Indeed, it tends to point to a gradual trend acceleration in the debt to market value 
ratio since the late 1980’s rather than the dramatic picture portrayed by the debt to income 
ratio. 
 
 
Source: ABS & RBA 
 
Equally an effective debt to equity ratio approaching 25 percent seems more reassuring – 
especially when compared to some other Anglo Saxon economies as shown below.  In part, 
the true story is that Australian households started gearing up later than most, and whilst they 
have moved into debt more aggressively recently, they still have a relatively larger level of 
“equity” in their housing than other Anglo Saxon economies. 
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Turning then to flow comparisons, the following chart shows total interest paid by Australian 
households as a proportion to gross household income plus interest and depreciation.  In 
Ratio of Housing Debt to the Value of the Housing Stock
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addition, the chart also shows total interest paid on mortgages as a proportion of the same 
income term. 
 
 
 
 
Source: ABS 
 
There are a number of striking features of the above chart.  First, and consistent with what 
has already been said, the chart clearly points to significant gearing up by households over 
the past 15 years.  Second, there has been a considerable consolidation of total debts into 
the mortgage – ie the gap between total and housing interest paid has significantly narrowed.  
That in large part reflects the improved ability of households to access equity in their homes 
through financial product innovation and, one could argue, the increased ability of households 
to consolidate their debt (into typically lower interest rate home loan rates). 
 
The third point that comes strongly out of the chart is the actual level of interest paid – either 
in total or on housing – has risen too, as a proportion of disposable income.  That is, both 
measures are above the peak of the ratio reached in late 1980’s/early 1990’s when official 
cash rates reached 18 percent.  In brief, if those levels of debt repayments crashed the 
Australian economy in the late 1980’s, why not now? 
 
A significant part of the answer to that question relates to a change in the proportion of higher 
income earners going into housing assets from around 2000 – which, in turn, contributes to 
the sharp increase in the ratio from that time.  In brief, the top income decile moved out of 
shares and voluntary superannuation and into housing.  No doubt, the driver of that asset 
allocation shift was associated with falling global equity markets at that time and may have 
also reflected changes in capital gain tax rate – and especially, the gap between the latter and 
the top marginal tax rate. 
 
While evident in the internal National Australia Bank Ltd data, there is also some evidence of 
that shift in asset allocation in publicly available data.  Thus, for example, the recently 
released ABS Household Expenditure Survey suggests that between 1998/99 and 2003/04 
owners with a mortgage in the top income quintile, increased by 9 percentage points vis-à-vis 
an increase of 5.4 percentage points for the entire household population.
4   Evidence
 of a 
move into housing by higher income earners in the early 2000’s is also evident in the 
Melbourne Institute/ING Household Savings report.  Thus, as shown in the chart below, data 
from this report, suggests that households with incomes above $100k and a mortgage, 
increased from around 2½ percent of all households to around 5 percent. 
 
Interest Paid By Households to Gross Household 
Income Plus Interest & Depreciation
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Households holding a mortgage
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What is important about this switch is that typically higher income earners with higher valued 
properties also have more assets for collateral against the loan.  While there is little/no public 
data of this type available, the following chart underlines this relationship.  The chart shows 
the loan to valuation ratio of NAB approved loans in April/May 2005 (using valuations made in 
April/May) against the value of the underlying property.  The data is drawn from a population 
of 10,750 approvals with total value of just under $2.4 billion. 
 
NAB Accepted Loan Amount to Valuation - May 2005
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All of the above does not detract from the fact that households are more geared and are more 
sensitive to either interest rate increases and/or loss of income flows (which are necessary to 
service that debt).  But increased interest payments as a percentage of income and higher 
debt to income ratios are not necessarily indicators of current or future economic and 
financial stress.  They undoubtedly reflect the combination of better economic conditions and 
low interest rates improving serviceability, together with a change in preferences of those at 
the top end of the income distribution to take on more housing debt.  These households, 
however, also have significantly higher asset holdings and hence “average” ratios are not a 
good indication of imminent financial stress.
5  
 
 
 - 7 - 
 
 
An Alternative Perspective on Housing Debt and House Prices 
 
One of the implications of the previous discussion is the increased willingness of households 
(especially at the top end) to gear up, and the effects of financial innovation that have 
increased households ability to tap into previously locked up equity in their property holdings. 
 
From that perspective we have attempted to generate a quarterly series which approximates 
a standard household’s average ability to borrow against their property holding.  That 
hypothetical borrowing ability (HBA) is given by the following formula. 
 
HBA = Average Weekly Earnings x 52 x Bank Income Test x (1/Standard Home Loan Interest 
Rate) x Loan to Valuation Ratio 
 
In the above formulae, regrettably, there is no publicly available time series data for either the 
bank income test or the loan to valuation ratios.  Accordingly, as our start point, the HBA 
calculations are initially set with a bank income test (BIT) and loan to valuation ratios (LVR) of 
0.25 of average weekly earnings (AWE) and 0.8 of property values respectively.  The former 
reflects what might be considered a typical base level entry point for bank approved loans, 
while the latter is the maximum loan to valuation ratio that banks are prepared to accept 
without insurance and/or the level where different capital treatment for the loans are required.  
Later these ratios can be changed to test the sensitivity of the HBA.  Use of state based AWE 
series allows the series to be calculated on a state by state basis.  As a cross check, the 
HBA, using today’s AWE estimates, was found to very closely replicate maximum bank 
lending calculations available on bank websites for a standard principle and interest on a 20 
year home loan. 
 
The state based HBAs, so calculated, were then compared to state based series of house 
prices using the REIA series.  This series was used in preference to the ABS series - which in 
our view is more methodologically sound - for two main reasons.  Firstly, it provides state 
based “level” estimates of house prices and, secondly, it allows for a longer run of time series 
(back to the December quarter 1983).  Also it should be noted that there are few substantial 
differences in the long run rate of growth of the REIA and ABS house price series.  To derive 
an Australian REIA series, the state based estimates were weighted by national account 
estimates for constant price real estate transfer expenses by state (i.e. the weights change 
quarterly)
 6 . 
 
By setting the HBA against house prices (both state and nationally) we get some indication of 
how much increased house prices have been driven by increased borrowing ability.  If, for 
example, households had just taken this ability to borrow (reflecting changed interest rates 
and earnings), and then fully used that ability to drive up house prices one would expect to 
see the following relationships (setting the HP/HBA index at 100 in December 1983). 
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Equally it follows that a reading significantly above 100 could be interpreted as implying 
house prices being driven up significantly above any fundamental servicing ability and hence 
potentially pointing to a problem unless something else has fundamentally changed (eg a 
change in bank lending standards and/or a change in population growth).  The following chart 
shows what the actual calculation shows (quarterly from 1983). 
 
HOUSE PRICES TO HYPOTHETICAL BORROWING ABILITY 
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The first thing that is apparent from the above chart is that, while somewhat above 100, the 
HP/HBA current readings are no where near as extreme as the levels reached in the late 
1990’s.  Again this underlines why, given current economic and financial conditions you 
should not be expecting to see signs of stress in household balance sheets, notwithstanding 
high debt to income ratios.  It is also interesting to note that while measures such as house 
prices to AWE point to concerns about overpriced Sydney markets, that result does not come 
through in this analysis.  Basically, the house price/income ratios tend to underplay the 
gearing ability that higher income levels in Sydney have when compared to the level of 
Sydney house prices. 
 
The analysis using HBA is also helpful for examining the significance of the variables 
underpinning the calculations – ie sensitivity analysis.  Thus, in the following chart the 
individual impact of: moving interest rates 50 points lower; or increasing the asset test to 30 
percent of AWE; or increasing the LVR ratio to 85 percent.  In each case the change is 
introduced at end 2002 and then maintained until the present. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis For Australian House Prices 
to Hypothetical Borrowing Ability
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This sensitivity analysis suggests that the largest impact on the HP/HBA ratio is derived from 
changing the bank asset test – with roughly equal, but more moderate effects from changing 
the LVR ratio and interest rates.  A combination of moving all these levers a touch would 
clearly, given current readings, have the ability to return the HP/HBA index back to or even 
below 100. 
 
While there is no official data on any of these variables, I suspect that some combination of all 
these factors has been in play.  Certainly, the standard home loans rate is higher than what 
households on average pay (reflecting both discounting in the face of strong competition and 
gearing up at the top end of the income distribution where discounting for larger loans is more 
common).  There is also much anecdotal evidence of some moderate easing in asset tests 
since early 2000.  Thus, if we were to replace the standard home loans rate with NAB housing 
spread plus the cash rate (implying a gradual lowering of the effective standard home loan 
rate from early 2003 until today when the rate implied is around 50 basis points lower) and a 
generalised easing in the asset test to 30 percent of AWE from 2000, the path of the HP/HBA 
ratio would be as follows.  Put another way, prices and borrowing ability have largely been 
aligned over the past couple of years. 
 
Australian House Prices to Hypothetical Borrowing Ability
 - Higher Income Test from 2000 & 1/2 % Lower Rates From 2003 -
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Another way of using the HBA approach would be to note that even without changing the 
criteria used by banks/financial institutions, the combination of continued income growth at 
around 4 percent per annum, one rate cut of 25 points in early 2006 (our forecast) and no 
change in house prices would bring the HP/HBA ratio back to around 100 by early 2008. 
 
The bottom line to all of the above is that broadly house prices do not look out of line with 
what might have been expected given households increased incomes, reduced interest rates 
and some marginal easing in bank lending criteria.  But under no circumstances can it be 
argued that house prices are way out of kilter with what could be expected (á la the late 
1980’s). 
 
That is not to say that household sensitivity to higher interest rates (or lower incomes) has not 
been fundamentally changed by increased gearing.  The simplest way to show this is to note 
that by shocking interest rates by 2½ percentage points (lets assume less discounting and a 2 
percentage point increase in the official cash rate) would, with no change in house prices or 
incomes, produce the same level of “disequilibrium” in the HP/HBA ratio as that experienced 
in the late 1980’s.  Clearly, in these circumstances, house prices and incomes would both fall 
with substantial real activity effects on the real economy. 
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What Determines House Prices: What the Australian Data Tells Us 
 
In this section, we attempt to put a little more rigour into an explanation of what drives house 
prices – or at least what the Australian data points to.  In terms of a longer run relationship 
clearly one would expect that the key drivers of HBA to be important – namely interest rates 
and household incomes.  Beyond that, population growth, on the supply side, could also be 
expected to be important.  Thus, we begin by estimating a long run (co-integrating) log linear 
equation of the type: 
 
LnHPt = α0 + α1 Ln (Pop) t + α2 Ln (HDY)t + α3 Ln (
i/p)t 
 
Where: HPt equals Australian house prices (as calculated in the previous section – i.e. using 
REIA state data, weighted by state real estate transfer expenses from the national accounts)
7; 
Popt is Australian population; HDYt is nominal household disposable income; and 
i/p t is real 
interest rates using the 90 bill rate deflated by the previous twelve month rate of increase in 
the trimmed mean CPI.  We would expect that α1 α2>0 and α3<0 – that is, house prices move 
up with further growth in population and income but down in the face of higher real interest 
rates.  Estimating the equation from 1983(1) to 2005(1) produced the following: 
 
LnHPt = -38.69** + 3.80 Ln(Pop)t** + 0.489 Ln (HDY)t** - .108 Ln(
i/p)t** 
 
R
^2 = .982  σ = .02    **is significant at the 5% level. 
 
Thus all variables are significant at the 5 percent level and have economically meaningful 
signs.  Indeed, the equation points to fairly large effects from population and income and 
interestingly real rates as well.  Indeed, we will later see in the next section on consumption 
and house prices, it appears that the transmission mechanism of high real interest rates goes 
through this significant impact on house prices, rather than directly entering into the 
consumption function. 
 
To complete this simple modelling of house prices, we employ the error correction 
methodology (ECM) of Engle & Granger (1987)
8 to estimate the short run dynamics of house 
price formation.  Going from the general form to the specific short run equation we included 
changes in all the variables (except population) in the long run equation, with the addition of 
changes in unemployment (to proxy uncertainties or expectations about future income flows), 
share prices (an additional wealth term) and housing starts (to account for short run housing 
cycle dynamics).  Population has been excluded from the short term dynamic equation 
because population changes tend to be more gradual. Because house prices are relatively 
sticky the specific short-run equation was estimated in the DLnt-4 form, representing annual 
changes.  Estimating from 1983(2) to 2005(1), with all variables tested with lags up to 8 
quarters, yielded the following equation: 
 
DLn(HP)t-4 = .086** + .82 DLn (HDY)t-4** + .036 DLn (sp)t-4** + .09 DLn (HS)t-4**  
 
-0.10DLn (UN)t-4** -.037DLn (
i/p)t-4** + .64 (DLn ((HP)t-4 )t-1** -0.15εt-4** 
 
R
^2 = .875  σ = .029  ( Excluding the autoregressive term R
^2 = .85)    
 
The equation passes normality and stability tests but the autoregressive term was included to 
correct for autocorrelation.  The latter had the effect of increasing the elasticity on changes in 
income and making changes in short term interest rates significant (albeit with a small 
elasticity). Other elasticities were not much changed. There was also no evidence of ARCH 
effects in the residuals.  The diagnostics for the house price change equation are presented in 
the table below.  
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Table: Residual Diagnostics for the House Price Equation (Short Run Change) 
 
 
Statistic  P - Value 
Normality Test  .0157 0.997 
AR 1-4  Test  1.0446 0.3903 
ARCH 1-4 Test  1.1432 0.3437 
 
Basically, the short run equation suggests that population while important in the long run does 
not enter short-term dynamics.  Rather the key determinants of short-run dynamics - in 
addition to the adjustment process from the longer run equation, which the short run equation 
implies takes around 1½ years – are: changes of income; changes in the share prices; 
changes in house starts; changes in real interest rates and unemployment.  All estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs and appear economically meaningful.  As shown below 
the equation (excluding the autoregressive term) has reasonably accurately captured the 
Australian house cycle dynamics since the early 1980’s. 
 
 
 
While the importance of terms such as income, population and interest rates could be 
expected, the importance of changes in unemployment is also worth noting.  Previous work 
on great housing price “crashes” offshore has, in our view, always pointed to the need for the 
combination of sharp increases in house prices and gearing (such as would be expected by 
exceptionally high values for the HP/HBA ratio) together with the loss of an income stream to 
finance that level of borrowings (ie the combination of reduced household incomes and 
associated unemployment).  While such “crashes” have not been evident in Australia over the 
past 50 years, the above equation suggests that such a mechanism would equally apply in 
Australia given the necessary triggers. 
 
Turning then to forecasting house prices.  To some extent our forecasts of house prices using 
the above framework will only be as good as our forecasts for the key variables.  That said, 
adopting our current medium term expectations of slower domestic demand, a moderate (10 
percent) further fall in construction activity, inflation rising to around 2¾ percent, a rate cut of 
25 points early in 2006, and a gradual increase in unemployment to around 5¾ percent by 
mid 2006, these equations basically suggest some moderate further falls in Australian house 
prices in late 2005 with only modest increases in 2006.  That is, given a broadly consensus 
(to a touch bearish) view of the economic outlook, these results essentially suggest a period 
of stagnant house prices over the next 12 months – but no crash. 
 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Australia: Acutal Vs Model Annual House Price Changes.R Sq.=.85
actual  fitted - 12 - 
 
 
 
Finally, on house price forecasting, it should also be noted that while the data does not exist 
to formally replicate these equations at the state level, it would suggest better outcomes for 
states where income growth is higher, the unemployment deteriorates less, and population 
growth is stronger.  That clearly would seem to support better near term outcomes for house 
prices in Western Australia and to a lesser extent Queensland, than for New South Wales and 
Victoria. 
 
 
Australian Consumption: The Impact of House Prices and Wealth 
 
In this section, we turn to examining the linkages between house prices and aggregate 
consumer spending.  To do this, we again use the ECM approach to estimate long run (co-
integrating) and short run dynamic consumption equations.   
 
There is a long tradition of estimating long run consumption equations with key variables 
being income, housing wealth, financial wealth and real interest rates.  Rather than starting 
out with housing and financial wealth, however, we replaced these variables by their key 
drivers, house prices and equity prices.  The house price term is the same one used earlier 
and the equity term is the ASX200.  To some extent the use of the equity term also could be 
justified via the literature which suggests that superannuation is very much viewed as a veil.  
The income term used is real household disposable income.  The estimated long run co-
integrating equation (estimated from 1982(1) to 2005(1) is as follows: 
 
Ln Ct = .826** + .877 Ln(Y)t** + .109 Ln (HP)t** + .002 Ln (SP)t** 
 
R
^2 = .997    σ = .011    ** signifies significance at the 5% level.   
 
As expected α1 α2 α3 > 0 and are all significant.  In the long run, the equation is suggesting a 
propensity to consume out of real disposable income of around 87 percent.  What is 
particularly striking, however, is the very large elasticity on house prices – implying that a 10% 
change in house prices leads to a 1% change in real consumption.  As implied in the previous 
section, there is a very high degree of correlation between interest rates and house prices. 
And, as a result, when the real interest rate term is included in the above equation it is either 
insignificant or enters with a minimal elasticity. Accordingly, real interest rates are dropped in 
our preferred long run equation – which as noted earlier implies that in a long run sense 
interest rates enter the consumption equation mainly via their impact on house prices.   
 
The other result in the equation that bears commenting on is the relatively small elasticity on 
the share market term.  Quite often elasticities associated with share market terms are 
estimated at between .01 and .05 (vis-à-vis .002 in our preferred equation).  What appears to 
be happening is that the strength of recent share market does not sit well against the recent 
pattern of slower growth in consumption.  In addition, it appears that, in the past, changes in 
Australian petrol prices (as reflected in the CPI) have typically had adverse impacts on share 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
Dynami c forecasts of DLAUSREIA4 from 2005(2) to 2006(1)
Data  Forecast ×  2*SE - 13 - 
market performance (which has certainly not been the case over the past year or so).  This 
can be shown by including petrol prices (CPI based measure) into the longer run equation.  
The implied long run elasticities that result are more like those traditionally estimated for the 
share market (or financial wealth) and imply elasticities of around -0.06 for petrol (that is 10¢ 
a litre reduces consumption by around 0.6).  The impact on the coefficients in the long run 
equation, with and without petrol, is shown in the following table.  For completeness, we have 
also included coefficients derived from IMF estimates of a long run equation based on 
housing wealth and financial wealth (rather than house prices and share markets).  The IMF 
equation also finds a very small but positive real interest rate effect. 
 
 
 
Our Preferred  
LR Equation 
Preferred Equation with 
 Petrol Prices included 
 
IMF 
Constant  .826** 1.025**  .87** 
Real Household Disposable Income  .877** .871**  .81** 
House Prices  .109** .134**   
House Price Wealth     .15** 
ASX 200  .0017** .013**   
Financial Wealth     .009  (not 
significant) 
Petrol Prices   -.066**   
Real Interest Rate     -.006** 
Estimation Period  1982(2)-2005(1) 1982(2)-2005(1)  1988(1)-2004(4) 
R
^2  .997 .998  .996 
σ  .011 .010   
 
Clearly there is little to choose between our preferred equation and the equation including 
fuel.  To some extent, the choice between the two comes down to whether you prefer to think 
of petrol prices as having a long run or short-run impact.  As we will soon see when imposing 
a short run dynamic equation on top of these equations, the data tends to prefer petrol as a 
short term impact (i.e. like a tax).  Both of these equations, while similar to the IMF’s wealth 
based equations, perform better.  But from a house price perspective, what is both interesting 
and compelling is the very high (and similar) estimated impact of house prices (or housing 
wealth) on consumption patterns. 
 
Turning to the short-run dynamic equation, the changes to the variables in the long run 
equation were included together with the change in petrol prices.  The resultant equation, 
estimated from 1982(2) to 2005(1), with all variables tested with lags up to 8 quarters, is: 
 
D Ln (C)t = .005** + .061 D Ln (Y)t**  + .078 D Ln (HP)t** + .009 D Ln (SP)t** - 0.022 D Ln 
(PP)t** - 0.09
4εt – 1** 
 
R
^2 = .459    σ = .0045    ** Significant at 5% level 
 
The equation passes normality and stability tests.  It also passes tests for auto correlated 
residuals at the 5 percent level of significance (but not at 10 percent level – which is 
confirmed by an ACF suggesting marginal problems at the 3
rd order). There was also no 
evidence of ARCH effects in the residuals.  The diagnostics for the consumption equation are 
presented in the table below.  
 
Table: Residual Diagnostics for the Consumption Equation (Short Run Change) 
 
 
Statistic  P - Value 
Normality Test  3.4902 0.1746 
AR 1-4  Test  2.0501 0.0955 
ARCH 1-4 Test  0.7967 0.5311 
Heteroscedasticity Test  13.0182 0.7905 
 
Basically the equation is again highlighting a strong short term input from changes in income, 
house prices and petrol prices.  With the elasticity on petrol suggesting a 10¢ per litre 
increase reduces consumption growth by around 0.2 percent in the short run.  Share prices 
also play a very small role.  The equation also suggests an adjustment speed back to 
equilibrium of around 2 1/2 years. 
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For completeness the following shows the results of the same short term equation 
specification put on top of the long run equation including petrol prices: 
 
D Ln (C)t = .005** + .055 D Ln (Y)t** + .034 D Ln (HP)t** - .0004 D Ln (SP)t** - 0.11εt-1 
 
R
^2  = .40    σ = .0048   **Significant at 5% level 
 
Relative to the previous short run equation, the elasticities on income are a touch lower, the 
elasticity on the share market is reduced to very small amounts and is incorrectly signed, and 
the equation did not find any significant additional link to changes in petrol prices.  To the 
extent that we tend to think of petrol price changes as a tax, this suggests that our preferred 
equation is, from an economic viewpoint, superior.  Also the above equation has marginally 
less explanatory power and while it passes normality and stability tests, it fails tests for auto 
correlated residuals. 
 
As shown in the following chart, as well as having both economically meaningful and 
significant elasticities, our preferred consumption equations - with petrol in the short run but 
not in the longer run – have also tracked the actual quarterly changes in consumption 
reasonably well over the past 20 odd years.  Interestingly the equation also has little problem 
with explaining the marked slowing in consumption growth in 2004, which many 
commentators at the time, including the Reserve Bank, cast doubt on.  Also given differences 
in the house price cycle across states it would follow that a good part of the stronger 
consumer spending observed in Western Australia in particular but also Queensland relate to 
this factor. 
 
Model v Actuals using Our Preferred Consumption Model – ie Fuel in the Short Run but 
Not in Long Run Equations:  
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Given the relatively high level of explanatory power provided by our preferred set of 
equations, a question arises about the impact of housing equity withdrawal on consumer 
spending.  This concept has received much popular attention (and was originally injected into 
the debate by the RBA using Bank of England definitions).  Basically, housing equity 
withdrawal /addition is defined by the RBA/Bank of England as the difference between the 
change in housing credit and the sum of new housing investment, alterations & additions and 
government transfer expense (eg stamp duty).  In the public arena, the concept has generally 
been simplified to the view that households have been withdrawing the extra equity built up in 
their housing by house price increases to maintain high levels of consumption spending in the 
face of lower growth rates in household incomes.  The implication being that once house price 
appreciation stops consumption must fall significantly. 
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Looking back at our preferred equation it is clear that changes in house prices have a very 
important impact; both in the short and long run.  However, it would appear that the 
mechanism captured by the equation is one whereby households run-up or run-down their 
propensity to consume out of income in the face of housing price changes.  If you like, in a 
time of rapid increases in house prices consumers are more inclined to run down saving 
balances and to some extent become “more asset rich and cash poor” – with the reverse 
occurring in times of slowing house price growth.   
 
On the question of households actually using their “redraw” ability, there is no economy wide 
data available – albeit the RBA is currently conducting a survey to better capture information 
on what is happening here.  That said, data from NAB covering actual redraws over the past 
few years suggests that there is a strong presumption that the physical use of “redraw” has 
not been a significant factor in explaining consumer growth.  Thus, the left hand panel of the 
following chart shows the behaviour of limit utilisation in the period from early 2003 to mid 
2004 (i.e. the peak period of negative housing equity withdrawal according to RBA data).  If 
households had really withdrawn around $50b in this period (as implied by the RBA 
estimates) one would have expected to see a significant increase in households’ utilisation of 
their drawing ability – clearly the chart shows that didn’t happen (at least at NAB).  Secondly, 
the right hand panel of the chart shows a relatively steady proportion of NAB’s housing book 
being used for redraw in the period from 2000 to mid 2004.  That proportion however is very 
small – at around 0.20 percent of the total book or a level of between $60m in 2000 to around 
$160m in mid 2004 (vis a vis a total book of NAB home loans of around $100bn).  The 
implication of these charts is that whatever role so called “housing equity redraw” (HEW) has 
played in changes in consumption (as against changing savings) behaviour, the actual equity 
withdrawal process is a very minor part of the story. 
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To further test this hypothesis, the Reserve Bank estimates for housing equity withdrawal 
(HEW) were entered into both our preferred consumption equities.  The results are shown in 
the following table (all reported coefficients are significant at the 5% level): 
 
  Long Run Equation  Short Run Equation 
Elasticities  Preferred Equation  
without HEW 
Preferred Equation 
with HEW 
Preferred Equation  
without HEW 
Preferred Equation 
with HEW 
Real Household  
Disposable Income 
 
.877 
 
.863 
 
 
 
House Prices  .1087 .093     
ASX 200  .0017 .018     
HEW     –   .036     
Constant  .8259 .992     
∆ Real Household 
Disposable Income 
 
 
  
.061 
 
.1067 
∆ House Prices    .078  .094 
∆ ASX 200    .009  Not  significant 
∆ Petrol    -.022  -.047 
∆ HEW         –   Not significant 
εt-1    -.094  -.184 - 16 - 
R
^2  .9975 .9986 .459  .442 
σ  .0108 .0087 .0046 .0046 
 
These results suggest that, in the longer run, the housing equity withdrawal term as 
calculated by the RBA does add, at the margin, to our preferred long run equation – albeit the 
implied elasticities on HEW is small.  The elasticities on our other key variables are broadly 
unchanged (albeit the constant term is reduced somewhat and the ASX term is increased).  
There was however no significant effect found for HEW term in the short run equation.  That 
said, relative to the long run relationship including HEW, the elasticities on short run income, 
house prices and petrol prices increased somewhat, the ASX term dropped out, and the 
adjustment speed back to the longer run equilibrium was marginally faster.  Overall the new 
short run equation, based on the long run relationship including HEW, performed marginally 
worse than our preferred short run equation.  Finally, either including or excluding the HEW 
term made little difference to stability, normality or autocorrelation test results. 
 
The bottom line, for the above results, is very much, that while including the HEW term 
improves the long run consumption relationship its impact is marginal in understanding the 
dynamics of consumer spending decisions – and is certainly not the main (or even a very 
important) mechanism of translating housing price changes (and or wealth) to consumer 
activity.  Put slightly differently, if house prices, for whatever reason, were to fall significantly it 
would matter little as to whether housing equity withdrawal had stopped or not. 
 
Concluding Observations and Summary 
 
I turn now to summarise some of the main themes picked up in the paper.   Clearly house 
prices and questions about “bubbles” and their implications for future economic growth are 
very topical.  Unfortunately too much of the popular debate has, at the very least, been 
simplistic in nature and, more often than not, highly misleading. 
 
High debt to income ratios, do not mean, given current policy settings, that current gearing 
ratios are either unsustainable or that a crash is inevitable.  Also from a balance sheet 
perspective the total level of debt relative to their assets are relatively low relative to other 
Anglo Saxon economies.  What higher debt to income, or more importantly, higher interest 
paid to disposable income ratios point to, is a much higher level of gearing in Australian 
household balance sheets.  This means that Australian consumers will be more sensitive to 
both actual movements in, and expectations about, interest rates and house prices.  
Jawboning on the latter aspect has, in my opinion, been very effectively used by the Reserve 
Bank to effectively talk down the so called housing “bubble”.   The effectiveness of that 
process avoided the need to do much in the way of monetary policy tightening, which, if it had 
been used, would have carried a much higher risk of a hard landing.  
 
It is important to also realise that there have, in recent years been some important changes, 
by income decile, in the holding of housing debt.  Thus part of the reason why there was a 
sharp increase in the “average” level of interest paid to disposable income, in the period 
around the early 2000s, relates to a shift by the top income decile out of equities and 
superannuation and into housing (especially investment housing).  That, in part, reflected 
relative returns in those markets, but probably also reflected tax wedges opened up between 
the top marginal tax rate and capital gains tax rate.  What is important to note is that the top 
income decile while carrying more debt also typically has more assets (i.e. lower loan to 
valuation ratios).  Once again, the main message relates to interest rate sensitivities rather 
than issues of sustainability (given current policy settings). 
 
In the paper we have also introduced the concept of a hypothetical borrowing ability, which 
when compared to actual movements in house prices, suggests that over the past 20 years 
households have effectively used their increased borrowing ability, associated with rising 
incomes and falling interest rates to bid up house prices.  Further this analysis suggests that 
current house price levels (unlike the late 1980’s early 1990’s) are not that far out of line with 
households financing ability – particularly when some allowance is made for moderate price 
discounting of standard home loan rates and some easing in asset test standards by financial 
institutions.  The analysis also highlights the now much heightened sensitivity to interest rate - 17 - 
movements – with a 2½ percent increase in rates being sufficient to create the same 
disequilibrium between the HBA and house prices as was apparent in the late 1980’s/early 
1990’s. 
 
Not surprisingly the key drivers of HBA – income and interest rates – together with population 
growth – were found, econometrically, to have played a major role in explaining long run 
movements in Australian house prices since the early 1980’s.  Beyond that, the construction 
cycle and the level of unemployment were also found to be important in explaining the shorter 
run dynamics of the house price cycle in Australia.  Further, when broadly “consensus” type 
forecasts of key variables in these equations are adopted, the outlook for house prices, over 
the next 12-18 months, appears to be one of stagnation– but not a crash.  That said, the 
equations underline the point that the house price outlook is extremely dependent on 
movements in interest rates and unemployment.   
 
Finally, by way of estimating a series of short and long run consumption functions, a key 
message that emerged was the very large elasticities that now run from changes in the rate of 
growth of house prices to consumption.  Interestingly, they also imply that the main impact of 
interest rates on consumer spending decisions comes via their impact on house prices.  
Broadly the results suggest a 10 percent change in the rate of growth of house prices is 
associated with around a 1 percent slowing in consumption expenditure.  These elasticities 
are considerably larger than those associated with petrol prices and equity markets, and in 
our view are very important in explaining the recent slowing in Australian households 
spending patterns.   
 
The dynamic, in our preferred equations, was very much one whereby households run-up or 
run-down their long run propensity to consume out of real disposable income (estimated at 
around 87 percent) in the face of changes in the rate of growth of house prices.  That is, in a 
time of rapid increases in house prices, consumers are inclined to run down their implied long 
run savings behaviour and become “more asset rich and cash poor” – with the reverse 
occurring in times of slowing house price growth. 
 
Running on from that dynamic, there is a good deal of doubt as to whether housing equity 
withdrawal, as popularly understood, is actually occurring.  Information from the National’s 
experience with redraw and loan utilisation limits do not support the hypothesis that redrawing 
equity from increased house prices was significant in recent years.  Including RBA estimates 
for housing equity redraw, in our preferred longer run equations did add some added power, 
but its impact on the dynamics of consumer spending decisions was found to be relatively 
marginal.  Rather, the main mechanism, as noted above, appears to be very much via 
changed “savings” behaviour. 
 
In conclusion let me go back to the title of the paper – and, in particular, the reference to 
irrational or rational exuberance.  It strikes me that the tag “irrational exuberance” can 
perhaps be better placed with the vigour to which some analysts use added debt levels in 
Australia to forecast “gloom and doom”  - rather than the actual behaviour of Australian 
households over the past few years.  Given current policy settings and house price levels 
household behaviour indeed looks reasonably rational.  That, however, is not to say that there 
hasn’t been a fundamental change in Australia household balance sheets – with profound 
implications for their sensitivity to actual, or threatened, swings in interest rates and house 
prices.  Clearly households are now, because of their increased gearing, much more sensitive 
to interest rates.  Also the impact of house price movements to real activity is much higher 
than is often understood – and what matters is the change in the relative growth rate of house 
prices and not whether levels are going up or down.  
 
Perhaps consumers are more aware of these dynamics than we give them credit and hence 
their apparent continual focus on “what will happen to my house price”.  From a policy 
viewpoint, the strength of the linkage from interest rates to house prices and then to 
consumer spending reinforces the view that, to avoid mistakes, the RBA will need to continue 
to be very measured in any change in policy settings.  Perhaps for commentators and the 
public, it also means that we should all expect to see “Maradona” monetary policy alive and 
well for many years to come.- 18 - 
Footnotes: 
 
1)  The Economist, 8 March 2003 “The Lucky Country”; 
 
The Economist, 5 June 2004 “Homing in on the Risks – House Price and the World 
Economy”;  
 
The Economist, 18 June 2005 “In Come the Waves – The Global Housing Boom” 
 
2)  Mervyn King, the Bank of England Governor, in the May 2005 Mais Lecture, likened 
the UK’s central bank’s approach to rate policy to the Argentine striker, who was able 
to run straight at England’s goal in the 1986 World Cup because the defenders were 
expecting him to move to the left or right.  Governor King then suggested monetary 
policy could act in a similar way, because movements in market expectations of 
interest rates might be enough to stabilise the economy without a need for changes to 
rates.    
 
3)  See: “Opening Statement to House of Representatives Standing Committee on  
  Economics, Finance and Public Administration”, Melbourne – 12 August 2005 
 
4)  The following table shows ABS Household Expenditure Survey Estimates for the 
proportion of households owning a property by income quintile, either with or without 
a mortgage.  
 
 
5)  Broadly similar conclusions about the absence of financial stress in Australian 
households, despite higher income and debt ratios, was also found by Gianni La 
Cave and John Simon in RBA Research Discussion Paper 2003-08.  That paper “A 
Tale of Two Surveys: Household Debt and Financial Constraint in Australia”, used 
Hilda and HES data and after separating households into “constrained” and 
“unconstrained” categories, found that much of the increased debt related to 
unconstrained households taking on more debt. 
 
6)  The following chart shows the differences in Australian house prices growth as 
calculated using REIA data and that using the ABS series.  While there are 
differences in growth rates they are not substantial.  Also it should be noted that 
much of the recent debate about what is the best or most useful measure of house 
prices really relates to the timeliness of the ABS data – not  whether it is applying the 
best methodology and is the most accurate. 
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7)  Use of the ABS house price series was also tested but the results did not vary 
significantly.  In essence, we have opted for a slightly inferior methodological series 
which does not provide fundamentally different growth rates to those generated by  
the ABS series, but has the advantage of providing a longer run of time series data 
(i.e. back to the early 1980s). 
 
8)  Engle, R.F. and Granger, C.W.J. (1987), “Cointegration and error correction 
representation, estimation and testing”, Econometrica, Vol. 55No.2, pp .251-76. - 20 - 
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